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The question of how a state should behave towards international norms has been 
discussed for centuries. The great Italian politician and philosopher Machiavelli once had a 
definite opinion on the matter: "(A) prudent Prince neither can nor ought to keep his word 
when to keep it is hurtful to him and the causes which led him to pledge it are removed".1 
Since then, however, the world underwent a fundamental change of the perception of the 
significance of international treaties and the binding nature of international legal norms. On 
September 24, 2012, the world's leaders gathered at a high-level meeting at the United 
Nation's headquarter in New York City to discuss the rule of law in international relations. 
Here, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki - Moon compared the rule of law to the rule 
of gravity, as it "ensured the world to be grounded, so that order prevailed over chaos".2 
Yet, next to praising the essential significance of international law, the high states officials 
present at this meeting were also aware of the fact, that also today, international legal 
obligations are not always honoured by states. Here, the International Labour Organization 
(ILO)3 and its Core Labour Standards (CLS)4 present a good example. With its longstanding 
history and 185 member states, the International Labour Organization incorporates values 
and standards, that almost all states around the world seem to formally agree upon. In the 
94 years since its foundation, the ILO adopted 189 Conventions and hundreds of 
recommendations. Among those, eight Conventions, that constitute the so-called CLS, 
stand out due to their special relevance and their impressively high ratification rates. 
Despite these favourable preconditions and an outstanding supervisory system, shocking 
news about harassments of union members or killed workers in factory fires5, make it 
obvious, that inhuman working conditions are still prevalent in many countries, that had 
actually pledged themselves to promoting decent work. So why did these states ratify these 
Conventions at all? Or to put the question more general: Why and when does non-
compliance with international law occur? What are the motives of states to comply with 
certain international treaties while disregarding others? 
                                                
1 Machiavelli, Niccolo (1532 (2005)): The Prince; Prestwick House Literary Touchstone Classics, p.80 
2 United Nations (2012): World Leaders Adopt Declaration Reaffirming Rule of Law as Foundation for Building Equitable State 
Relations, Just Societies; Department of Public Information, News and Media Division; available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11290.doc.htm (last access: 05/01/13) 
3 In this bachelor thesis, the abbreviation ILO will be used when referring to the International Labour Organization 
4 In this bachelor thesis, the abbreviation CLS will be used when referring to the Core Labour Standards 
5 See for example: Naundorf, Karen (18/09/07): Gewerkschaften in Kolumbien: Wer stört, fliegt raus – oder stirbt; Spiegel 
Online; available at: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/gewerkschaften-in-kolumbien-wer-stoert-fliegt-raus-oder-stirbt-a-
505829.html (last access: 05/01/13); Bajaj, Vikas (25/11/12): Fatal Fire in Bangladesh Highlights the Dangers Facing Garment 
Workers, The New York Times; available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/world/asia/bangladesh-fire-kills-more-than-
100-and-injures-many.html (last access: 05/01/13) 
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The aim to give an answer to these questions and explain states' motives behind their 
behaviour towards international legal norms, lies at the centre of a vivid academic date, that 
is especially characterized by the differing views of political and legal scholars of the 20th 
century. Although a variety of different theories arose, most still lack thorough empirical 
testing. While most authors undermine different parts of their theories with different, 
momentary applicable empirical events6, there is a lack of publications, that apply all 
aspects of one theory to one empirical phenomenon. Therefore, this bachelor thesis aims to 
contribute to closing the gap of empirical testing of prevailing compliance theories by 
applying selected theories to the highly interesting case of the ILO and its CLS. 
In the first part of this bachelor thesis, the structure of the ILO, the content of the CLS and 
the organization's supervisory system will be introduced. Additionally, quantitative data on 
the status quo of ratification and compliance with the Core Labour Standards is provided, in 
order to draw an accurate picture of the ILO and states' behaviour towards its Conventions. 
After clarifying the concept of compliance in the ILO's context, the second part will display 
the most relevant theories on compliance from the 1990s onwards, to which I refer to as 
contemporary compliance theories. Next to providing an overview on the variety of 
prevailing theories, two well established theories, namely the managerial theory of Chayes 
and Chayes and the reputational theory of Guzman, are depicted in detail. Subsequently, 
they are applied to the case study of Bangladesh, in order to test their ability to explain the 
country's behaviour towards the ILO Convention on the freedom of association and 
protection of the right to organise, which the country had ratified in 1972. While it gets 
obvious, that both theories provide valuable insights to understanding the member state's 
behaviour, non of them is able to fully explain all relevant aspects. Thus, the results of the 
case study entails adjuvant findings for the academic debate on compliance. Moreover, 
from the outcomes of this analysis, useful conclusions for a more efficient structure of 
supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, that might enhance compliance with the CLS, 
can be drawn. Although a detailed discussion of these implications would go beyond the 
scope of this bachelor thesis, incentives for further research will be given in the conclusion. 
                                                
6 See for example: Chayes, Abram, Chayes, Antonia H. (1993): On Compliance; in: International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2, 
Downs, George W., Rocke, David M., Barsoom, Peter N. (1996): Is the good news about compliance good news about 
cooperation?; in: International Organization Vol. 50, Issue 3 
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2 The International Labour Organization and its Core Labour Standards 
2.1 Composition and Functioning of the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
The ILO's structure is marked by its three main organs: the Governing Body, the 
International Labour Office and the International Labour Conference.7 
The Governing Body is the executive council of the ILO. It meets in Geneva, Switzerland, 
three times a year and consists of 56 delegates, who are elected every three years. 
According to Article 8 of the Constitution of the ILO, the Governing Body appoints the 
Director-General of the ILO.8 Moreover, it sets the agenda for all meetings of the 
International Labour Conference and administers the budget of the ILO.9 The International 
Labour Office, which is also located in Geneva, is the permanent secretariat and 
operational headquarter of the organization. It is conducted under the leadership of the 
Director-General of the ILO, who is elected for a five-year term.10 According to Article 10, 
the duties of the International Labour Office include the preparation of the Conference 
meetings, the support of member states by providing technical and legal assistance with the 
implementation of international labour standards as well as the issuing of publications on 
relevant topics.11 The International Labour Conference is the legislative body of the 
organization. This "world parliament of labour"12 meets once a year in Geneva. Next to its 
ability of admitting new members to the ILO, the International Labour Conference elects the 
Governing Body and approves the budget and programme draft provided by the latter.13 But 
first and foremost, international labour standards - in the form of international Conventions 
or Recommendations - are adopted in this central lawmaking body.14 The successful 
adoption of Recommendations and Conventions requires a majority of at least two-thirds of 
the attendant delegates15. While Recommendations are guidelines without any legal 
effect,16 Conventions create legal obligations for the member states, that ratified them.  
The ILO bodies are characterized by the organization's tripartite structure, which is unique 
at the international level.17 By adopting this special structure, the ILO aimed at promoting 
                                                
7 To the International Labour Conference, it is often also referred to as the General Conference of the ILO. In this bachelor 
thesis, however, I will use the term International Labour Conference. 
8 International Labour Office (2010): Constitution of the International Labour Organisation and selected texts, Article 8 
9 Karns, Magaret, Mingst, Karen (2010): International Organizations – the Politics and Processes of Global Governance;  p.80 
10 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 8 (1) 
11 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 10 (1), (2) 
12 International Labour Organization (2011): World of Work - World Parliament of Work turns 100, p.3 
13 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 1 (4), Article 7 (2) 
14 Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, Article 19 
15 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 19 (2)  
16 They are primarily designed to support the member states to amend national labour standards with regard to policy, 
legislation and practice. For more information, see: International Labour Office (2006): Handbook of procedures relating to 
international labour Conventions and Recommendations, p.2 
17 Kaufmann, Christine (2007): Globalisation and Labour Rights, p.50 
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open dialogues and reciprocal sympathy between the three parties of governments, 
employers and workers in order to achieve sustainable solutions.18 With regard to the 
International Labour Conference, the delegation of each member state consists of four 
representatives: two government officials, one delegate representing the employers as well 
as one representing the working people of the respective member state.19 The employer 
and worker delegates are hereby chosen in agreement with the most relevant national 
organizations of workers and employers. Of the 56 members of the Governing Body, 28 are 
government representatives, while the other 28 represent employers and workers and are 
elected by the employers' and workers' delegates to the International Labour Conference.20 
This structure also applies to the chairman of the Governing Body and its two deputies – 
one of them being a state official, the other two representing workers and employers 
respectively.21  
2.2 The Core Labour Standards (CLS) 
2.2.1 Special Character 
In 1998, the International Labour Conference adopted the "Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work" with an overwhelming majority.22 With the declaration, the 
ILO introduced a certain "hierarchy of international labour standards"23, as it directed 
special attention to a group of seven Conventions. In 1999, an eighth Convention was 
added to this group of Conventions24, that were characterized as "fundamental" as they 
represent universal human rights.25 They embody four principles, namely the freedom of 
association and right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child labour as well as the elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.26 The declaration makes these 
eight Conventions a quasi condition of membership, as Article 2 states, that all member 
states "have an obligation, arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization, to 
respect, to promote and to realize"27. Although the declaration is not legally binding28, the 
                                                
18 International Labour Organization (2008): The ILO at a glance; p.3 
19 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 3 (1) 
20 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Artile 7 (1), (4) 
21 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 7 (7) 
22 Bakvis, Peter, McCoy, Molli (2008): Core Labour Standards And International Organizations: What Inroads Has Labour 
Made?, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, International Trade Union Cooperation, Briefing Papers No 6, 2008, p.1 
23 Helfer, Laurence R. (2006): Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO; 
Vanderbilt Law Review Vol. 59, No. 3, p. 708 
24 An overview on the eight fundamental Conventions can be found in the appendix I 
25 De la Cruz, Héctor B., von Potobsky, Geraldo, Swepston, Lee (1996): The International Labor Organization: The 
International Standards System and Basic Human Rights; Westview Press, Inc., Boulder; p.129 
26 International Labour Office (2003): The International Labour Organization's Fundamental Conventions; p.7 
27 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, Article 2; in: International Labour Office 
(2003): The International Labour Organization's Fundamental Conventions, p.73 
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special standing of these eight Conventions can also be seen in the supervisory 
mechanisms of the ILO, which will be introduced in section 2.3. Another characteristic of the 
fundamental Conventions is, that in order to facilitate and encourage universal compliance 
with them, several fundamental Conventions contain flexibility clauses. These provisions 
are considerate of the low development status of some member states, that therefore face 
especial difficulties in implementing the content of the Conventions. The minimum age 
Convention C138, for example, allows countries to temporarily exclude certain categories of 
workers or whole sectors from the scope of the Convention.29  
2.2.2 Content 
The effective erasure of forced or compulsory labour is regarded as a central cornerstone in 
achieving the ILO's overall goal of decent working conditions and global social justice. The 
first Convention on this topic was adopted in 1930 (C029), a time when many countries still 
bore traces of the age of colonization and certain forms of slavery were still prevalent, 
especially in non-metropolitan territories. Here, the member states obligated themselves to 
fully suppress the use of forced labour. The legal definition of the term forced labour is set 
forth in Article 2 (1) of the Convention C029 and encompasses "all work or service which is 
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person 
has not offered himself voluntarily".30 It includes all kinds of labour in all industries, also in 
the informal31sector.32 Certain types of work or services, that meet the just described 
characteristics of forced labour are explicitly excluded from the scope of the Convention: 
the fulfilment of a basic military service, the instruction of work in extreme national 
emergency situations or work assignments of lawfully convicted prisoners, for example in 
the context of community work.33 In 1957, a second Convention on the topic was adopted in 
the background of the atrocities of the Second World War and the knowledge about political 
regimes, that systematically used forced labour to boost their economies.34 With its 
ratification, the governments pledged themselves, among others, not to use forced labour 
                                                
28 López, Sergio, Ugarte, Sebastián (2010): Analysis and Critical Assessment of the Role Played by the International Labour 
Organisation in Developing and Securing Core Labour Standards; in: Panorama Socioeconómico; Año 28, No.41, p. 202 
29 International Labour Conference (1973): Minimum Age Convention, 1973; Articles 4,5 
30 International Labour Conference (1930): Forced Labour Convention, 1930; Article 2 (1) 
31 The informal sector covers small-scale enterprises, that are not recognized, recorded or regulated by the public authorities. 
For more information, see: International Labour Office (2002): Decent work and the informal economy 
32 International Labour Conference (2007): General Survey concerning the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); pp. 19 - 20 
33 See: Article 2 (2), Forced Labour Convention, 1930; International Labour Conference (2007): General Survey concerning 
the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); pp. 22 - 24 
34 De la Cruz, Héctor B., von Potobsky, Geraldo, Swepston, Lee (1996): The International Labor Organization: The 
International Standards System and Basic Human Rights, p. 132 
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"as a punishment for holding or expressing political views or views ideologically opposed to 
the established political, social or economic system".35 
Another central aim of the ILO is, that all children have the opportunity "to develop 
physically and mentally to his or her full potential".36 By adopting the Minimum Age 
Convention (C138) in June 1973, the ILO aimed at establishing a general minimum age 
requirement for admission to employment. Article 2 (1) of the Convention C138 prompts 
every member state to define a "general minimum age for admission to employment or 
work within its territory".37 The provision hereby includes contractual employments, informal 
or self-employed work or unpaid work in family businesses.38 In general, the specified age 
should be equal or higher compared to the age of completion of compulsory school 
attendance and not allow admission to employment for children below the age of 15.39 As 
until 1999, only 72 member states had ratified the Minimum Age Convention, the ILO 
undertook a new approach to direct the world's attention to this central topic. In 1999, the 
International Labour Conference adopted the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 
(C182).40 This Convention lays its focus on the immediate prohibition on the most damaging 
and hazardous types of child labour and was adopted unanimously.41 Among others, all 
children below the age of 18 shall be protected from all forms of forced labour, slavery, 
trafficking, prostitution and pornography, as well as all illicit activities and work, that "is likely 
to harm the health, safety or morals of children".42 In both Conventions, the significance of a 
free access to basic education in the process of abolishing child labour is repeatedly 
emphasized.43 
The fundamental principle of the elimination of discrimination encompasses the Equal 
Remuneration Convention (C100) as well as the Discrimination Convention (C111), which 
is concerned with equality concerning opportunity and treatment in employment. Both, 
Convention C100 as well as Convention C111 apply to all workers and therefore allow no 
exclusions based on the nationality of the worker, the gender or other individual 
characteristics.44 Convention C100, which was adopted in June 1951, sets general 
                                                
35 International Labour Conference (1957): Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957; Article 1 (a) 
36 International Labour Office (2003): The International Labour Organization's Fundamental Conventions, p.43 
37 International Labour Conference (1973): Minimum Age Convention, 1973, Article 2 (1) 
38 International Labour Conference (2012): General Survey on the fundamental Conventions concerning rights at  work in light 
of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008, p. 148 
39 International Labour Conference (1973): Minimum Age Convention, 1973, Article 2 (1), (3) 
40 Dennis, Michael J. (1999): The ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor; in: The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 93, No. 4, p.943 
41 International Labour Conference (2012): General Survey on the fundamental Conventions concerning rights at  work in light 
of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008, p.187 
42 International Labour Conference (1999): Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999; Article 3 
43 Minimum Age Convention, 1973, Article 2 (3), Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999; Article 7 (c), Article 8 
44 International Labour Conference (2012): General Survey on the fundamental Conventions concerning rights at  work in light 
of the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008, pp.275,276, 308 
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standards for the equal payment of male and female workers for "work of equal value".45 
The concept of equal remuneration for work of equal value requires the member states to 
identify the relative value of different occupations and compare the wage, salary and any 
additional payments received in connection with the respective employment.46 Convention 
C111, on the other hand, aims at abolishing discrimination " on the basis of race, colour 
sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin" or any other unjustified 
distinction at the workplace.47 
The last principle, that lies "at the heart of the ILO's purpose"48 is the freedom of association 
and the right to collective bargaining. The functioning of the ILO's tripartite structure would 
not be possible without the existence of freely established and independent workers' and 
employers' organizations. Especially the Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize Convention from 1948 (C087) is seen as central, as it entails the 
prerequisites for collective bargaining, which is protected by Convention C098.49 Article 2 of 
the Convention C087 states, that all workers and employers "shall have the right to 
establish and (…) to join organisations of their own choosing without previous 
authorisation".50 Furthermore, governments have no right to interfere in organisational 
issues of the organisations, to influence the elections of representatives or to dissolve or 
suspend the organisations. The Convention allows for restrictions only with respect to the 
police and armed forces.51 Therefore, the rights of this Convention apply to all workers and 
employers in the private industry, as well as to those in public services.52 Convention C098 
from 1949, on the other hand, explicitly excludes public officials.53 For the rest of the 
workers and employers, it prompts governments to establish "adequate protection against 
acts of anti-union discrimination"54 as well as to "encourage and promote"55 negotiations 
between employers and workers regarding wages, working hours and other terms of 
employment. 
                                                
45 International Labour Conference (1951): Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951, Article 1 (b) 
46 International Labour Conference (1951): Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951, Article 2; International Labour Conference 
(2012): General Survey on the fundamental Conventions concerning rights at  work in light of the ILO Declaration on Social 
Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008, pp.281, 282 
47 International Labour Conference (1958): Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958, Article 1 
48 López, Sergio, Ugarte, Sebastián (2010): Analysis and Critical Assessment of the Role Played by the International Labour 
Organisation in Developing and Securing Core Labour Standards, p.202 
49 ibid. 
50 International Labour Conference (1948): Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948, 
Article 2 
51 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948, Articles 3, 4, 9 
52 De la Cruz, Héctor B., von Potobsky, Geraldo, Swepston, Lee (1996): The International Labor Organization: The 
International Standards System and Basic Human Rights, p. 182 
53 International Labour Conference (1949): Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949; Article 6 
54 International Labour Conference (1949): Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949; Article 1 (1) 
55 International Labour Conference (1949): Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949; Article 4 
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2.3 The Supervisory System of the ILO 
The structure and complexity of the ILO's supervisory system is unique. Many scholars 
refer to it as "the most effective"56 and "the most venerable"57 monitoring system at the 
international level. It applies to all member states after the formal ratification of a 
Convention.58 Next to a regular system of supervision, there are also three special 
procedures following representations or complaints filed by workers' unions, employers' 
organizations or other member states. 
All member states have to submit regular reports, in which they inform the ILO about the 
measures taken and the progress achieved towards full compliance with the Convention.59 
In the first year after a Convention entered into force, the member states have to provide a 
detailed report, which has to provide information on all relevant national laws, the 
authorities, that are responsible for enforcing those laws, limitations to the scope of the 
application and statistical data.60 In the subsequent years, shorter, simplified reports are 
sufficient.61 The member states have to forward all reports to the workers' and employers' 
representatives, who have the right to critically comment on the content of the documents.62  
Those reports and comments are then reviewed by the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, which consists of 20 qualified jurists 
from different geographical regions and legal systems. After their analysis, the Committee 
can pronounce an observation or a direct request to the government of the concerned 
member state.63 With a direct request, the Committee of Experts prompts the respective 
member state to provide supplementary information on a point of interest, for example on 
the technical implementation of a provision of the Convention. Observations, in turn, mostly 
express the Committee's discontent with a significant and permanent failure to meet the 
obligations of the Convention. They are published in the yearly report of the Committee of 
Experts, which is sent to the Governing Body for transmission to the International Labour 
Conference. Topics of especial interest or concern may be discussed in the next meeting of 
the International Labour Conference, which augments the pressure on non-complying 
                                                
56 Van Dervort, Thomas R. (1998): International Law and Organization: An Introduction; Sage Publications, p.214 
57 Weisband, Edward (2000): Discursive Multilateralism: Global Benchmarks, Shame and Learning in the ILO Labor Standards 
Monitoring Regime; in: International Studies Quarterly No.44, p.644 
58 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 19 (5d) 
59 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 22 
60 International Labour Office (2006): Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and 
Recommendation; p.24 
61 International Labour Office (2006): Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and 
Recommendation; p.20 
62 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 23 (2); López, Sergio, Ugarte, Sebastián (2010): Analysis and 
Critical Assessment of the Role Played by the International Labour Organisation in Developing and Securing Core Labour 
Standards; in: Panorama Socioeconómico; Año 28, No.41, p.203 
63 International Labour Standards Department (2008): Guide to International Labour Standards; p.261 
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member states.64 The annual report of the Committee of Experts, in turn, is analysed by the 
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards. This tripartite Committee offers a 
forum for state officials, employers and workers to meet and discuss the requests, 
observations and other recommendations made by the Committee of Experts.65 The results 
of the Conference Committee's work are summarized in its report to the International 
Labour Conference. This report also includes discussions on individual cases and draws 
the attention of the Conference to serious failures of compliance. It is sent to the member 
states, which are expected to consider the advice of the Conference Committee in their 
further proceedings.66 
The first special procedure, which is based on Articles 24 and 25 of the ILO Constitution, 
deals with the examination of representations. A representation can be made by any 
national or international association of employers or workers and expresses the concern, 
that a member state has failed to comply with provisions of a ratified Convention.67 After the 
reception of an admissible representation, the Governing Body sets up a tripartite 
committee to examine the matter. After a thorough investigation, during which the 
committee requests written statements or personal appearances of government 
representatives of the concerned member state, the tripartite committee submits its 
conclusions and recommendations to the Governing Body, which will finally decide on the 
further proceedings and whether the recommendation will be published. 68  
The second special procedure concerns complaints about the insufficient compliance of a 
member state with a ratified Convention and is based on Articles 26 to 34 of the ILO 
Constitution. Complaints can be filed by member states, delegates or the Governing 
Body.69 Once a complaint is received, it is transferred to the Commission of Inquiry.70 This 
Commission consists of three members and investigates the complaint by reviewing 
documents, hearing witnesses or by on-site inspections in the concerned member state.71 
Within a period of three months, the two parties to the conflict decide whether they accept 
                                                
64 International Labour Office (2006): Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and 
Recommendation; p.37 
65 International Labour Office (2011): The Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference, 
p.1  
66 International Labour Office (2006): Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and 
Recommendation; p.40 
67 International Labour Standards Department (2008): Guide to International Labour Standards; p.265 
68 International Labour Office (2006): Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and 
Recommendation; pp.48,49; Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 25 
69 International Labour Standards Department (2008): Guide to International Labour Standards; p.268 
70 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 26 (2),(3) 
71 International Labour Standards Department (2008): Guide to International Labour Standards; p.268 
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the proposals of the Commission of Inquiry or not. If no agreement is reached, the case 
may be referred to the International Court of Justice for a final decision.72  
The third special procedure was established in 1950 by a decision of the Governing Body 
and deals with complaints regarding the freedom of association. Here, complaints can be 
filed against any member state, regardless of whether it has ratified the Conventions on the 
topic or not.73 When the International Labour Office receives a complaint, it is examined by 
the tripartite Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association. Similarly to the other 
special procedures, the concerned member state is prompted to comment on the accuses 
made. But even if the government ignores these requests, the Committee continues to 
examine the case by reviewing documents and hearing witnesses.74  
Next to these versatile supervisory mechanisms and complaint procedures, the ILO also 
offers different forms of technical assistance. The member states have the possibility to ask 
for advise or get concrete solutions for legislative and practical problems, that impede full 
compliance with a Convention, by contacting the numerous ILO offices around the world.75 
2.4 Status Quo: Ratifications and Compliance 
Despite impressively high numbers of ratifications, none of the eight fundamental 
Conventions has been ratified by all 185 member states. The Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention C182 and the Forced Labour Convention C029 have the highest rate of 
ratification. With 175 ratifications, these two conventions were signed by almost 95 % of the 
member states of the ILO. The fact, that Convention C182 achieved this impressive amount 
of ratification in little more than ten years, makes it by far the most successful example of 
the ILO's work.76 The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention C087, on the other hand, is the fundamental Convention with the lowest 
ratification rate. 34 states refused to ratify the Convention, among those China, India and 
the United States of America.77 Five member states of the ILO – namely the Marshall 
Islands, the Maldives, Palau, South Sudan and Tuvalu - have ratified none of the eight 
fundamental Conventions. 136 member states have ratified all eight fundamental 
                                                
72 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, Article 29 (2), Article 31 
73 Romano, Cesare P. (1996): The ILO System of Supervision and Compliance Control: A Review and Lessons for Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements; p.16 
74 See: International Labour Office (2006): Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and 
Recommendation; pp.50-52 
75 International Labour Organization (n.d.): Technical assistance and training; available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/standards 
/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/technical-assistance-and-training/lang--en/index.htm (last access: 
05/01/13) 
76 ibid 
77 See appendix I. Here, information about the number of ratifications of the fundamental Conventions is provided. 
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Conventions, among those all member countries of the European Union, but also 
developing countries such as Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo or Haiti.78  
In the appendix, an overview on the number of complaints, representations and 
observations received by the different member states during the last three years (2009 – 
2011) is provided. Altogether, the ILO Committee on the Application of Standards adopted 
an impressive amount of 1184 observations on the applications of the eight fundamental 
Conventions. Here, most observations concerned the Convention C098 and C087. Only 
three representations were filed, two against Cuba and one against Japan. Out of the 76 
complaints, 73 referred to the Convention C087 on the freedom of association. In twelve 
cases, complaints were filed against member states, that did not ratify the Convention 
C087. The table, however, should not be interpreted in the way, that all countries, that did 
receive complaints or observations are in total non-compliance with a Convention.  
The general definition of compliance, that is applied in this bachelor thesis is the one of 
Raustiala and Slaughter, who state, that compliance is a "state of conformity or identity 
between an actor's behavior and a specified rule"79. This definition is agnostic in the sense, 
that it does not necessarily establish a causal relationship between the rule itself and the 
state of conformity with it.80 An ILO Convention, however, consists of numerous different 
rules. While a state may be in compliance with certain parts of the Convention, it can be 
non-complying with other parts. Therefore, it is essential to notice, that the concept of 
compliance with regard to an ILO Convention is not a binary variable but rather a 
continuous concept. Next to the poles of complete non-compliance and full compliance with 
a Convention, there are many possible intermediate levels of compliance. If a state obtains 
a high or low level of compliance with a Convention, does not hinge on the number of single 
provisions of the Convention, that it is in compliance with, but on the fact, if it is in 
compliance with the most central provisions of the Convention. A central provision of a 
Convention shall be defined as a provision, that reflects the core purpose and aims of the 
Convention. States, that implemented central parts of ratified Conventions in law and 
practice show a high level of compliance, even though minor contradictions to the content 
of a Conventions might still exist in law or practice. States, that failed to implement central 
provisions of the Convention, as there are opposed national laws or there is a lack of 
sufficient enforcement mechanisms, on the other hand, have a low level of compliance. A 
lack of legislation on a topic does not necessarily affect the country's level of compliance, 
as compliance can also be ensured through practical measures. If a country has national 
laws on labour rights, however, that entail unjustifiable restrictions or limitations to these 
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rights, it can be said, that the country has a low level of compliance or is non-compliant in 
central parts. An example here would be the legislation of Bangladesh, which will be 
addressed in the case study in section 4. 
3 Theories of Compliance with Norms in International Relations 
The origins of the academic debate about the relevance of international law and 
explanations for states' compliance with it date back to the 1940s. During the Cold War era, 
compliance theory was characterized by the debate between realist political scientists and 
historians such as Morgenthau, Kennan and Schwarzenberger, who were sceptical about 
an exogenous influence of international law on states and legal scholars such as 
McDougal, Falk or Henkin, who all advocated the relevance of international law.81 From the 
1990s onwards, the two disciplines of International Relations and International Law began 
to interact and scholars from both disciplines increasingly collaborated on the topic.82 This 
resulted in today's great variety of competing theories, that all aim to explain states' 
behaviour towards norms in international relations. Not all of the prevailing theories, 
however, meet the requirements of an expedient theory. Next to explaining compliance with 
international law, a comprehensive compliance theory should also elucidate situations of 
non-compliance.83 Furthermore, the theory should make an assumption, whether there is a 
causal relationship between the normative character of an international obligation and the 
compliance of states, which means that the existence of international law per se has a 
behavioural impact on states, or not. If such a causal relationship was identified, the theory 
should additionally explain, how international norms manage to influence states' behaviour 
towards compliance.84  
3.1 Overview of Existing Theories 
So far, there is no unisonous categorization of the different existing theories on the topic.85 
Burgstaller identifies three basic models by distinguishing realist, institutionalist and 
normative theories.86 Koh, on the other hand, differentiates between a rationalistic 
instrumentalist approach, a liberal one and a constructivist strand.87 By separating interest-
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based models from norm-based models, Hathaway identified two broad veins.88 This rather 
simplistic differentiation nicely captures the existence of two opposed background 
assumptions on the behaviour of states, that root in the differing perceptions of states of the 
classic International Relations theories: The first assumption would be, that the behaviour of 
states is led by their national self-interests. Here, rational and self-serving states calculate 
the gains or losses of complying with an international agreement. In the end, they will only 
comply if it benefits them. Therefore, international norms have no direct impact on the 
behaviour of states. The second assumption, on the other hand, assumes, that states feel 
moral obligations and have a natural instinct to comply with international agreements. If 
they do not comply, it is not a matter of opposed self-interest but can be explained by 
various, justifiable reasons such as a lack of resources or because states think the norms 
are unfair. In the following, Hathaway's distinction of interest-based and norm-based 
theories will be retained to briefly introduce the most relevant theories of both strands. 
3.1.1 Norm-Based Approaches 
A first example of a norm-based theory is Thomas M. Franck's legitimacy theory.89 
According to Franck, states comply with international norms, whenever the norms are 
perceived as having a high degree of legitimacy. In order for legitimacy to exist, a norm has 
to be established "in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process".90 In 
Franck's theory, legitimacy is modelled as a continuous concept with the two poles of being 
completely illegitimate and being entirely legitimate. Legitimacy causes states to comply 
with norms, as it "exerts a pull toward compliance"91on states. The intensity of this 
compliance-pull, however, is positively correlated with the perceived degree of legitimacy of 
the norms – if a norm is appraised as highly legitimate, the pull is very strong. On the other 
hand, if the legitimacy of a norm is controversial, states experience no - or a relatively weak 
- impulse to comply with the norm. Therefore, also compliance is a matter of degree.92 
Pursuant to Franck, states determine the level of legitimacy of a norm by considering four 
characteristics: determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence as well as adherence.93 
Determinacy describes the level of transparency and lucidity of a norm. A norm, that is 
enunciated in a clear and unequivocal manner, which leaves no room for misinterpretations 
of the norms content and aim, encourages states to comply with it.94 Symbolic validation 
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describes the communication of authority through well-established, consistent procedures.95 
States rather comply with norms, that are regarded as being of essential significance and 
emanated from a traditionally respected, valid process. A norm can signal its righteous 
origin by using cues, such as rituals, pedigrees or emblems.96 Coherence means, that a 
rule is general and applied in a consistent manner, that treats equal cases equally. When 
states feel, that a norm is just in the sense, that it follows strict principles and does not 
enable any wrongful exceptions from the scope of application of the norm, they are rather 
willing to comply with it. Contrariwise, if a norm is unprincipled or contradicts other 
established rules in the international legal system, it will be categorized as illegitimate and 
there will be no compliance with it.97 The last factor, that affects the degree of legitimacy of 
a norm, is adherence. Adherence describes the connection between a single norm and the 
set of secondary rules of process, that structure the establishment, interpretation and 
application of the norm.98 According to Franck, rules are rather complied within a 
sophisticated international community, that not only creates primary norms of obligations 
but backs those norms with an institutional framework of secondary rules, that allows for the 
enforcement and advancement of the primary norms.99 Among others, a main point of 
criticism of Franck's legitimacy theory is, that his argumentation is circular. While legitimacy 
exerts a compliance-pull, the strength of the compliance pull also measures the degree of 
legitimacy of a norm.100 Moreover, Franck does not elaborate on the reasons, why and how 
legitimacy is able to influence the behaviour of states. Therefore, the assumption, that 
legitimacy is the crucial factor for compliance, remains unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the 
model does not provide explanations for empirical examples, where states changed their 
behaviour with a norm from compliance to non-compliance.101  
The legal scholar Harold Koh developed the so-called transnational legal process theory. 
Koh aims to explain obedience of states with international norms, which describes a state of 
compliance, that is not motivated by anticipation of enforcement but due to the fact, that 
norms are incorporated into the domestic legal systems of the states and are herewith 
becoming part of a state's "internal value set".102 Repeated compliance results in "habitual 
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obedience"103 with international norms. Pursuant to Koh, the transnational legal process, 
that leads to the incorporation of a norm, "is normative, dynamic, and constitutive".104 The 
repetition of this process leads to the emergence of regular patterns of behaviour and will 
eventually shape national interests and identities. Koh differentiates three sequential 
phases of the transnational legal process: interaction, interpretation and finally 
internalization. At first, the transnational actors of states, such as private companies, 
individuals or non-governmental organizations, initiate an interaction on a certain topic with 
one another. This interaction at the international level leads to the emergence and 
interpretation of norms, which are then internalized and incorporated into the domestic legal 
system. With this last step of internalization, obedience - and therefore also compliance - 
with the norm is achieved.105 Raustiala and Slaughter criticize Koh's approach as it fails to 
address situations of non-compliance.106 Another point of criticism is, that the theory 
provides no explanation for how the process of internalization of international norms is 
conducted. Therefore, the theory lacks an answer to the question of why international 
norms should be internalized when they are in conflict with the self-interest of the state.107 
A third theory on the norm-based side of compliance theories is the one from Abram and 
Antonia Chayes. In my point of view, their managerial theory is the most convincing one of 
this strand due to its ability to not only address situations of compliance but to also explain 
non-compliance with international legal norms. It will be discussed in the following section 
and is subsequently applied to the case study of Bangladesh in section 4. 
3.1.2 Interest-Based Approaches 
Downs, Rocke and Barsoom criticized norm-based theories for their inability to fully explain 
states' motives for acts of non-compliance with international norms. Therefore, they 
presented their own approach, which is often referred to as enforcement theory.108 The 
cooperation of states at the international level is modelled using a game-theoretic 
approach. Here, a state's strategy is to maximize its payoffs by pursuing national interests, 
which are shaped by the economic and political aims of domestic interest groups. In the 
authors' point of view, the possibility of enforcement of international norms, via sanctions 
and punishment for non-compliance, is therefore the crucial factor for compliance. A state 
will comply with an international norm, if the anticipated net benefit of non-compliance is not 
positive, which means that the gains of a state from the violation of the norm are not 
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exceeding the costs of the violation. A negative net benefit of non-compliance can be 
ensured by establishing adequate punishment strategies.109 Here, Downs, Rocke and 
Barsoom emphasize that the decisive variable for compliance of states is the adequate 
extent of enforcement – the concrete form of the punishment system, for example whether 
centralized or decentralized measures are used, is rather irrelevant.110 The authors also 
introduce the term "depth" with regard to international treaties, in order to describe the 
extent, to which it prompts behavioural change from the states, in the sense of that the 
treaty "requires states to depart from what they would have done in its absence".111 A rather 
deep international treaty needs stricter sanctions, as the gains from cooperation – and 
therefore also those from defiance – grow with the depth of the treaty.112 One stated point of 
criticism concerning the enforcement theory is, that the authors do not comment on the 
possibility, that preferences of potential defectors could change during repeated 
interaction.113 Furthermore, the difficulties of the establishment of effective sanctions, 
especially in a multilateral setting, are not addressed.114 
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner established a rather critical theory of international law.115 
The authors see international law as being highly limited in its ability to change the 
behaviour of states, as there are no moral obligations, which could states cause to comply 
with international law.116 International law is rather "a product of, and bounded by, state 
interests and the distribution of power."117 Goldsmith and Posner also use a game-theoretic 
model and differentiate  - depending on the topic and the political dimension of the topic - 
between cooperative and non-cooperative games, such as the well-known prisoners' 
dilemma game and coordination games.118 With regard to coordination games, where all 
would profit from behaving equally, the main achievement of international law is, that it 
"provides a focal point for coordination" and is herewith able to augment the probability of a 
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successful cooperation between states.119 Concerning a prisoners' dilemma, negotiations at 
the international level and the emergence of international norms can help to realize the 
cooperative solution.120 This clarifies, that notwithstanding their point of view, that 
international legal norms do not act as "exogenous force(s) on state behavior"121, Goldsmith 
and Posner are of the opinion that international law is not irrelevant. Yet, international 
norms are drafted by states and therefore only emerge, if the participating states expect 
positive gains from the cooperation. When the situation changes, for example due to new 
developments regarding domestic politics or economic or technological progress, 
international law changes, as states aim to adapt it to the new circumstances. Non-
compliance occurs, when states expect not to benefit from compliance any more. When 
calculating the gains and losses from compliance, states consider the direct benefits and 
costs from complying but also take into account the indirect negative consequences of non-
compliance, such as retaliation or reputational loss. Just as the other presented theories on 
compliance, also Goldsmith and Posner's approach provoked criticism. Raustiala 
animadverts, that Goldsmith and Posner's rational-choice theory is "mainstream"122, as it 
strongly assembles already existing international relations literature. Buchanan challenges 
the claim, that there exist no moral obligations to comply with international law. In his point 
of view, states represent individuals, which do have a moral sense. Therefore, states 
cannot entirely ignore the moral side to international law.123 
Andrew Guzman, on the other hand, criticises, that the authors do not put enough 
emphasize on the impact of reputational consequences. In his own reputational theory, 
which I will present in the following section, he urges, that the fear of direct and reputational 
sanctions strongly affects state behaviour towards international norms. As this theory offers 
valuable insights concerning the behaviour of states towards international legal norms, it 
will be applied to the case study of Bangladesh. 
3.2 Managerial Theory 
Antonia and Abram Chayes first introduced the managerial theory in their paper "On 
Compliance" in 1993. This norm-based theory of compliance hinges on the background 
assumption, that states have "a propensity to comply"124 with international law.  
In the first part of the paper, the authors substantiate their assumption, that states generally 
want to comply with international legal norms, by elaborating on the reasons behind it. The 
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second part of the paper is concerned with explaining situations of non-compliance. These 
mostly unintended deviances from international legal obligations derive from three 
circumstances: ambiguity, capability and a temporal dimension. In the third part, which is 
not central to this analysis, the authors define their concept of an acceptable level of 
compliance, as they argue that the strict aspiration of perfect compliance from all members 
of a treaty regime is not reasonable. They differentiate between technical infringements, 
that do not threaten the existence of the concerned regime and are therefore tolerable and 
violations, that endanger the regime as a whole and thus have to be restrained.125 In the 
following, the reasons for compliance and non-compliance put forward by the Chayeses' 
managerial approach will be depicted in detail. 
According to the authors, the assumption of the interest-based vein of compliance theories, 
that states just comply with international law, when it is in their interest to do so, is neither a 
statement based on empirical facts, nor does it meet the requirements of a testable 
hypothesis. Correspondingly, however, there is also no way to doubtlessly validate the 
assumption, that states generally tend to comply with international law, as empirical proof 
can be found for both, the interest-based as well as the norm-based point of view.126 
Therefore, the authors put considerable emphasis on substantiating, why they think, that a 
normative background assumption of states willing to comply is more profitable for 
explaining compliance with international treaties.  
The first argument in favour of their background assumption is based on efficiency 
calculations of states. Policy decisions are costly, as they require precedent analyses of the 
situation and herewith burn up governmental resources. As these resources are scarce, 
governments will only question previously made decisions, if the circumstances leading to 
these decisions have fundamentally changed.127 Hence, "efficiency dictates considerable 
policy continuity".128 Instead of constantly recalculating decisions, states will prefer to follow 
an established rule. In regard to a ratified Convention of the ILO this means, that the normal 
and efficient reaction of a state would be to aim to comply with it. 
The second argument of Antonia and Abram Chayes is, that the voluntary character of 
international treaties implies, that states only become a part of it, if it lies in their national 
interest to do so. These national interests are not fixed, ex-ante defined facts but evolve 
during the drafting of a treaty, as there, states "explore, redefine, and sometimes discover 
their interests."129. The managerial approach does not see states as unitary actors but 
recognizes, that there are different national agencies and bureaucratic entities involved in 
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the preparation of a national position on the topic at the national level. They all have their 
own positions and agendas. Thus, a national position and a state's interests in a certain 
topic are not pre-existent but shaped in these internal interactions, which thoroughly 
consider the state's options at a long-term point of view130. During the subsequent 
international negotiations of the treaty, states have the opportunity to influence the content 
and exact wording of a treaty by persuading other states of their line of argument. 
Ultimately, the final draft of a treaty reflects a compromise of the interests of all participating 
states. By having the chance to form coalitions, Chayes and Chayes stress, that also small 
states have the opportunity to block or alter positions brought forward by stronger states.131 
Problems could arise, when a state's national position on the topic changed between the 
time of the negotiations and the final adoption of the treaty or when states, that could only 
add little to the final draft, show their disappointment by opposing the final treaty. The 
authors reply by stating, that "the very act of making commitments"132 causes a state to 
tend to comply, as it is aware of the compliance expectation of other states. Furthermore, 
treaties are not static but can be modified and adjusted consonant to changed interests of 
the involved states.133 Additionally, when states have very oppositional views on a topic, the 
expected result is also not widely spread non – compliance with an adopted treaty. Instead, 
the states are already aware of that problem at the negotiation stage and draft a rather 
general treaty on a "lowest-common-denominator"134 basis, which could be amended in the 
future.  
The third argument put forward by the authors relies on the normative character of an 
international obligation. The fundamental and unchallenged principle, that paved the way 
for today's broad international cooperation, is the norm pacta sunt servanda, which means 
that treaties must be honoured.135 Just like individuals usually obey the legal norms of their 
country, states also feel an obligation to comply with international law. This can be derived 
from the accuracy and precision, that characterizes the negotiations on international 
treaties. If states did not intend for international legal norms to be obeyed, high state 
officials and government members would not spend such an remarkable amount of time 
negotiating and debating even tiny details of international law.136 Another reinforcing factor 
is, that democracies, that are built on the principles of good governance and the rule of law, 
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radiate credibility when also acting in accordance with these principles at the international 
level.137 
Regarding situations of non-compliance, Antonia and Abram Chayes argue, that most of 
the time, breaches of international obligations are not the deliberate and intended choice of 
states. Although such "wilful flouting"138 might occur at times, when governments want to 
appease the international community by entering a treaty but have no intention to comply 
with it afterwards, it remains exceptional. 
One of the three justifiable reasons for most cases of non-compliance is ambiguity of the 
treaty language, that arises from a vague formulation of central treaty provisions. On the 
other hand, however, also overly detailed phrasing can hamper compliant behaviour of 
states. Vague formulations occur, when the participating parties to the treaty negotiations 
could agree upon a precise solution and therefore chose a wording, that leaves room for 
individual interpretation. Unfortunately, this might lead to a "zone of ambiguity", where it is 
difficult for states to identify the lines between compliant and non-compliant behaviour.139 
Sometimes, the drafting parties do not anticipate an important case of application, for which 
the treaty then lacks clear instructions. Likewise, also an excessively complex, convoluted 
treaty can prove problematic, as it also contains the danger of implicitly excluding relevant 
areas of application by explicitly enumeration its areas of application.140 While at the 
national level, those interpretative problems could simply be solved by the ruling of a court, 
in international relations, there is no final authority, that clarifies the correct interpretation of 
the norm. 
Another cause of non-compliance are capability limits of a state. The formal legislative and 
administrative process following the ratification of a treaty requires a functioning 
bureaucratic structure, fiscal resources as well as versed experts, that take care about the 
technical implementation. If a state does not meet these requirements, such a "deficit in 
domestic regulatory capacity"141 can debar states from complying with their international 
obligations. Especially developing countries are therefore dependent on international 
technical assistance, that assists these states to build up an effective enforcement 
system.142  
The last cause of non-compliance, that Chayes and Chayes address, is that international 
legal obligations, which demand a significant change of behaviour from states, require a 
considerable amount of time to be implemented, leading to a time lag between the 
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ratification of a treaty and the earliest possible date of compliance.143 The ILO reacts to this 
time lag problem by providing transitional arrangements in many of its Conventions, that 
allow states to implement incremental changes over a determined period of time instead of 
demanding ad hoc compliance. One example for such a transitional clause would be Article 
1 of the Forced Labour Convention (C029), where a period of five years at most is granted, 
in which forced labour may still be used as an exceptional measure for public purposes.144 
In summary, the arguments put forward by the authors to underpin their background 
assumption of states' general willingness to comply as well as those explaining mostly 
involuntary breaches of international obligations make it obvious, that the Chayeses' 
managerial approach opposes coercive military or trade sanctions but rather favours 
supportive measures in terms of technical assistance and persuasion to enhance 
compliance.145  
3.3 Reputational Theory 
In his paper "A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law", Andrew T. Guzman 
develops a theory of compliance with international law, which is centred on the assumption, 
that states are rational actors, that pursue their national interests. The self-interest of a 
state is an exogenous, given variable, as Guzman makes no assumption on how a state 
identifies its national goals. A state's decision whether to comply with an international 
obligation146 can be affected by international law in two ways: by possible direct sanctions 
for non-compliance or by reputational damages, that a breach of an international obligations 
might entail.147In the first part of the paper, Guzman designs a single period one-shot game, 
where a state decides whether to comply or not. In this setting, which is based upon the 
neorealist view of international relations, international law is irrelevant. In the second part, 
however, Guzman relaxes the assumption of a single period and now analyses an infinitely 
repeated game. Here, international law is able to affect state behaviour in the previously 
described way. Although Guzman's game-theoretic illustrations use a bilateral setting with 
only two states being involved, his core statements of an rationally calculating state, that 
considers possible sanctions and reputational consequences of its behaviour, can easily be 
applied to the multilateral context. In the following, Guzman's assumption of irrelevance of 
international law in a single period game will be briefly introduced before elaborating on the 
assumed influence of international law in an infinitely repeated setting. 
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In order to show, that international law has no influence on state behaviour in a game, that 
is repeated finitely, Guzman analyses two distinct situations. These two game situations 
have different payoffs for compliance and non-compliance and therefore result in different 
dominant strategies for the players. The first situation represents a simple prisoner's 
dilemma, that is displayed in the appendix (figure III). Here, it is the dominant strategy for 
each country to renege on the agreement.148 This gets obvious when analysing the given 
payoffs of the game: If country 1 assumes, that country 2 will comply, it is better for country 
1 to violate the agreement as the payoff of 6 in the case of defection is higher than 5, which 
country 1 would get if it complied. The same results can be derived for the assumption, that 
country 2 violates the law and for the strategic calculations of country 2 based on the 
anticipated behaviour of country 1. Therefore, the resulting Nash equilibrium is, that both 
states do not comply. The inefficiency of this outcome can be seen in the fact, that the two 
countries would both have had higher benefits if they had complied. Contrariwise, one could 
also imagine a situation, where it is the dominant strategy for both countries to comply. This 
setting is also illustrated in the appendix (figure IV). Here, compliance occurs because it 
entails higher gains for a state, regardless of what the other state does.149 In both 
situations, however, international law does not influence the strategy of a state because the 
assumption of a single period impedes, that the countries consider sanctions or reputational 
consequences, that would alter the payoffs in future replays.150 This neorealist view of 
irrelevance of international law, however, could not explain why countries spend a 
considerable amount of resources to negotiate and participate in treaties.151 
If an infinitely repeated game is assumed, international law is able to influence the 
behaviour of states by altering the payoffs through the threat of sanctions and reputational 
losses and hereby changing the equilibrium of the game.152 In this model, states decide in a  
first period, whether to enter the international legal obligation or not. Then, they decide in 
each subsequent period whether to comply with it or not. If the payoffs turned out to 
constitute a game, in which compliance is the dominant strategy, international law would, 
once again, have no impact as states comply with the obligation voluntarily. In the case of a 
prisoner's dilemma, however, compliance will only occur, if international law manages to 
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alter the payoffs of the participating countries in a way, that makes compliance the 
dominant strategy.153 
Guzman makes the assumption, that states only conclude treaties with states, that have a 
good reputation. A country loses its good reputation, as soon as it violates an international 
obligation.154 The payoffs of this infinitely repeated game are displayed in the appendix 
(figure V), but Guzman's detailed mathematical derivation will only be discussed to the 
extent, that is necessary to understand the essential message of his model. Guzman's core 
statement is, that due to the infinity of the game, states take into account future payoffs, 
which depend on their behaviour in previous periods. A state is aware, that if it violates the 
agreement once, it can never become part of it again, as the agreement as well as the good 
reputation of the state are destroyed. If both countries comply, they both get a payoff of 5 in 
the current and each future period, if both violate the agreement, the agreement is broken 
and they get a lower payoff of 3 in this and all future periods.155 Gains in future periods are 
discounted by the rate r, in order to ascertain their present value. A high r means, that the 
state is rather impatient and values the gains it gets today much more than gains, which it 
expects to receive a couple of years from now. If a country violates the agreement in the 
current period, while the other complies, it gets a one-time payoff of 6, put in all future 
periods to come it just gets the low payoff of 3. A country, that complies with the agreement 
in the current period, while the other country cheats, just gets a payoff of 2 and a payoff of 3 
in the future. The efficient equilibrium, where both states comply, can be achieved, if both 
countries have a sufficiently low discount rate r156, which means that they attach enough 
importance to the future consequences of their behaviour.157   
The reputational effect, however, is not always strong enough to alter state behaviour. Due 
to this and to the fact, that the dynamic nature of state preferences can rapidly alter the 
payoffs of a state, situations of non-compliance occur.158 The magnitude of the reputational 
effect of defection hinges on various factors: For one, the relevance of reputation varies 
between states.159 Although having a good reputation is generally beneficial for states, as it 
enables them to profit from a variety of potential agreements with other states, not every 
state wants to build up a strong reputation by honouring international agreements. Some 
states have no interest in accumulating "reputational capital"160, as they prefer immediate 
short-term gains to long-term benefits, which could only be received through a stable, 
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cooperative relationship with other states.161 Second, especially in highly sensitive policy 
fields, such as decisions regarding war or peace or other security issues, the effect of 
reputation is rather negligible. When the stakes of a policy decision and herewith the 
possible gains and losses attached to it are very high, a country is unlikely to be influenced 
by the reputational consequences of the action, as even the complete loss of reputation 
would represent a relatively small additional cost.162 Third, the reputational consequences 
of non-compliance also depend on the "nature of the violation"163. If, for example, the 
violation does not cause any harm to other involved states or is rather technical, the 
reputational consequences will be small. The same applies to cases, where the state has 
justifiable reasons for violating the agreement or if the other states did not even realize, that 
a violation occurred.164 On the other hand, states  can also suffer reputational losses for 
implicit obligations or obligations, it is not a part of. Here, Guzman presents the example of 
the Basle Accord, which is expected to be universally accepted, also from those countries 
that did not sign it.165 
Next to reputational consequences, also direct sanctions are able to influence state 
behaviour. Due to the difficulty of imposing direct sanctions at the international level, 
however, the previously described reputational effects are more relevant.166 Guzman 
defines the term sanctions includes "all costs associated"167 with non-compliance, such as 
economic punishment or retaliation of other states. If states are able to credibly threaten 
other states with such sanctions, they are more efficient than reputational measures and 
lead to optimal compliance168 with an international obligation.169Most of the time, sanctions 
represent retaliatory measures, such as the imposition of trade restrictions as an answer to 
newly adopted trade tariffs of a certain state. Sometimes, punitive sanctions such as 
embargos are imposed, which next to punishing the offending state also lead to a higher 
overall compliance as the threat of punishment is now credible.170 In general, however, 
sanctions are easier to conduct in bilateral situations than in a multilateral context. In a 
multilateral agreement, the free rider problem might occur, as all countries benefit from the 
sanctions, that one country imposes on an offender, which leads to inefficiently low use of 
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sanctions.171 On the other hand, multilateral organisations hold the advantage, that states 
can easier be persuaded to voluntarily accept sanctions or to undertake actions to atone for 
their failures, as otherwise, they might face expulsion.172 
In summary, Guzman's theory draws a picture of international law, that is more likely to 
influence states' behaviour in policy fields, where states frequently interact and that are not 
considered as "high stake" policy fields. Here, reputational consequences and the threat of 
sanctions can alter the cost-benefit analysis of states in a way, that compliance becomes 
the optimal strategy.  
4 Case Study: Bangladesh 
4.1 General Information and Overview on the Compliance Situation 
The People's Republic of Bangladesh was founded in 1971 after gaining independence 
from West Pakistan. After a short period of democratic rule (1971 – 1975), Bangladesh was 
governed by a military regime until 1990.173Since then, the multiparty democratic rule was 
only disrupted between 2007 and 2008, when a "military - backed caretaker government"174 
was established in order to calm the riots and political unrest in the country. Since 2009, 
Bangladesh's parliamentary democracy is led by president Zillur Rahman and prime 
minister Sheik Hasina Wajed. The general elections leading to the victory of an alliance led 
by Sheik Hasina Wajed's party Awami League in December 2008, were considered as free 
and fair. Besides a violent rebellion of the border security force in early 2009, the last years 
were marked by increased political stability and calmness.175 
Yet, according to the 2011 report of the non-governmental organization Freedom House, 
the country still struggles with fostering its democratic structures and building up an 
administration, that is entirely based on good governance, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights.176 The political work is furthermore constricted by the deep-rooted enmity 
between the two main political parties Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
(BNP) and their leaders, Sheik Hasina Wajed and Khaleda Zia.177 Wide spread corruption 
and the misuse of state resources in the country are seen as one of the most essential 
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impediments to sustainable developmental progress.178 The United Nations Human 
Development Index currently ranks Bangladesh at position 146 out of 187 countries.179 
Despite Bangladesh's unfavourable climate conditions and recurring natural catastrophes, 
Bangladesh experienced a steady growth rate of its gross domestic product (GDP)180 in the 
last decades. Since 2000, Bangladesh's economy constantly grew with a positive rate 
between 4,4 % and 6,7%.181 In 2011, the GDP per capita was 743 US Dollar, while in 2001, 
it was only 356 US Dollar.182The country's economy heavily depends on its export sector. 
Here, Bangladesh's top performing sector is the textile industry with its main export goods 
of knitwear, woven garments and jute goods.183 The roots of the country's export – oriented 
economic policy dates back to the 1980s, when the former leader General Ziaur Rahman 
opened the country to foreign trade relations and promoted foreign investments of 
industrialized countries.184 Today, Bangladesh's main export partners are the United States 
of America, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and other European states.185 
Bangladesh joined the ILO in 1972. Since then, it has ratified seven of the eight 
fundamental Conventions, that together build the Core Labour Standards. It did not ratify 
the fundamental Convention C138, which defines a minimum age for employment. 
Furthermore, Bangladesh ratified two of the four governance Conventions and 24 of the 
177 technical Conventions.186 The fundamental Convention on the freedom to association 
and the right to organise (C087), on which the focus of this chapter is laid on, was ratified in 
1972. From the start of Bangladesh's membership in the ILO, there were cooperative 
signals from the state. An ILO office was opened in Dhaka in 1973 and since then, 
numerous technical cooperation projects were conducted in the framework of the ILO's 
Decent Work Country Programme (DWCP) for Bangladesh, that all aimed to enhance 
working conditions and social protection in the country, in order to ensure full compliance 
with the Core Labour Standards.187 Until today, however, serious violations of the ratified 
fundamental Conventions are prevalent. The International Trade Union Confederation 
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(ITUC) lamented in its most recent country report, that neither in law nor practice, the 
Convention C087 on the freedom of association and the right to organise is adequately 
implemented.188 Also the ILO repeatedly called the government's attention to deficits in 
Bangladesh's compliance strategy. The ILO's supervisory bodies published observations in 
2009, 2010 as well as 2011.189 Furthermore, the Bangladesh Cha - Sramik Union of tea 
workers filed a complaint due to violent suppressions of demonstrations and state 
interferences in the election of union officials by using the ILO's special procedure for 
freedom of association cases in early 2010.190  
The main points of criticism with respect to the Convention C087 are, that the registration of 
unions is hampered by overly complex procedures and is often denied by the responsible 
authorities.191 Although Article 38 of Bangladesh's Constitution states, that "every citizen 
shall have the right to form associations or unions"192, this right is constricted by various 
legal limitations and so far, the government made no serious attempts to achieve significant 
improvements. The new Bangladesh Labour Act from 2006, which was originally expected 
to improve former legislation on the topic, contained even more restrictions. Among others, 
it excludes many categories of workers from the right to organise or establish workers' 
organisations.193 According to section 179 (2) of the Labour Act, a union is not entitled to 
registration "unless it has a minimum membership of thirty percent of the total workers 
employed in the establishment"194 - if it falls below this percentage, it can be 
deregistered.195 A maximum of three trade unions may be registered at a company and 
workers are not allowed to join more than one trade union – otherwise they face 
imprisonment.196 These and numerous other provisions of the Labour Act are in clear 
contradiction to the  purpose and content of Convention C087. 
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Also the special labour legislation in the country's Export Processing Zones (EPZ)197 is a 
point of discontent.198 Workers in these eight zones fall under a separate legislation and are 
therefore exempted from the application of the Labour Act and other general labour laws. In 
2010, the EZP Workers' Association and Industrial Relations Act from 2004 was amended 
due to pressure from the ILO. The newly introduced EPZ Workers' Welfare Society and 
Industrial Relations Act 2010 (EWWSIRA), however, contained no considerable 
improvements for the rights of workers in the EPZ as the ILO noted "with deep regret"199. 
Per industrial unit, only one "Workers' Welfare Society" may exist.200 In order to establish 
such an union, 30 % of the workers have to ask for it. Then, the head of the Bangladesh 
Export Processing Zones Authority (BEPZA)201 conducts a referendum in the respective 
establishment and only if more than 50 % of all workers participate in it and an absolute 
majority of the participating workers is in favour of the establishment of the "Workers' 
Welfare Society", the head of the BEPZA authorises it. Furthermore, the head of the 
BEPZA regulates the electoral procedure for the union's representatives and has to give his 
approval, if the union wants to receive external funds. The union can be disestablished if at 
least 30 % of the workers, regardless of whether they are members or not, request it and in 
this case, may not be re-established  for one year. Furthermore, according to section 46 of 
the EWWSIRA, industrial action is strictly forbidden until 31 October 2013.202 In the future, 
the government of Bangladesh plans to expand the concept of EPZ and to install more of 
these free trade zones in the country.203 
Yet, Bangladesh's compliance problems go beyond inadequate legal protection of workers 
as the – as previously seen mostly insufficient – legislation is also not effectively enforced.  
The most recent complaint of the tea worker's Bangladesh Cha – Sramik Union, for 
example, offers a good example. Here, the union claims, that trade union leaders were 
removed from office without any reason and that subsequent, peaceful demonstrations 
were violently suppressed by police forces, which both not only contradicts the provisions of 
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Convention C087 but also national law.204 Furthermore, in practice, regular intimidations of 
union activists occur, as they are sued, dismissed or confronted with other threats by their 
employers. This "strong anti-union culture"205 in Bangladesh makes it highly difficult to 
achieve the legal minimum requirements for the registration of a union.206  
Weighing up the empirical facts, Bangladesh's behaviour towards international obligations 
arising from the ratified ILO Convention C087 seems ambivalent. On the one hand, 
Bangladesh accepts and supports the presence of ILO advisors and other international 
organizations in the country, that aim to improve the working conditions of the population. 
Furthermore, the government repeatedly assures, that "it is fully aware and committed to 
freedom of association".207 On the other hand, so far, Bangladesh has failed to implement 
central parts of the Convention C087 into its national laws and provides no effective 
enforcement mechanisms for existing laws on workers' rights. In the following, the 
managerial theory from Abram and Antonia Chayes as well as Guzman's reputational 
theory will be applied in order to examine their ability to explain Bangladesh's behaviour 
towards the ILO Convention C087. 
4.2 Application of the Managerial Theory 
According to the Chayeses' managerial theory, states generally want to comply with their 
international legal obligations. The stated reasons behind that background assumption also 
apply here. Although Bangladesh had no opportunity to contribute to the original draft of the 
Convention, as it was already adapted by the International Labour Conference in 1948 – at 
a time, when Bangladesh was not yet a member of the Organization - the country 
voluntarily chose to become a part of the Convention. With the ratification act, Bangladesh 
made a normatively binding commitment, that should motivate the state to comply with the 
Convention's provision. Bangladesh's present failure to fully comply with the Convention 
C087 in law and practice, on the other hand, should then be explainable by either an 
unclear formulation of the Conventions, Bangladesh's inability to comply due a lack of 
resources or the fact, that there was simply not enough time to achieve full compliance 
since the ratification date. 
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The first argument of Chayes and Chayes, that non-compliance may be attributed to an 
ambiguous phrasing of the provisions of the Convention C087, is ineligible in this case. 
Other member states of the ILO, such as Finland, are in full compliance with the 
Convention. This serves as a first indicator, that there can be no general ambiguity to the 
Convention. Secondly, even if Bengali legislators experienced problems with understanding 
and interpreting the provisions of the Convention, they could have sought for technical and 
legal assistance of the ILO. Thirdly, in its numerous observations and direct requests, the 
ILO has depicted in detail, which of Bangladesh's national laws are contradictory to the 
Convention and how they should be altered.  
Before addressing the seemingly plausible reason of a lack of regulatory capacity, the 
inaptitude of the temporal dimension justification, is explained. Bangladesh ratified the 
Convention C087 in 1972, right after becoming a member of the organisation. Since then, 
40 years have passed. Even though the country experienced significant political upheavals 
and economic difficulties during that time, at least legal compliance with the norms should 
have been possible. The adoption of the new Labour Code in 2006 or the new EZP 
legislation in 2010 showed, that the country has functioning legislative procedures. 
The argument, that Bangladesh's non-compliance is caused by a lack of resources, needs 
to be addressed in detail. On the one hand, Bangladesh's low development status and the 
widespread corruption in the country might indeed complicate a smooth collaboration 
between the different national authorities, that are responsible for implementing the 
Convention's content. The low educational standard in the country might lead to a scarcity 
of competent administrators and legal experts. Furthermore, a lack of fiscal resources might 
impede a thorough analysis of the working conditions in different sectors of the economy 
and the realisation of regular inspections of enterprises. And even if the government was 
able to finance those inspections, the problem of corrupt public servants and police 
members would seriously confine their effectivity. Here, however, it is essential to differ 
legal compliance from problems, that might occur in regard of the practical enforcement of 
laws on workers' rights. Bangladesh's long-term failure to amend its national laws cannot be 
justified by its low development status, that led to a scarcity of competent legal experts or 
administrators. Like previously mentioned, the ILO offers extensive technical assistance to 
its members in order to ensure the conformity of the national laws with the Convention. 
Practical enforcement of existing legal provisions, on the other hand, can indeed be 
severely hampered by the country's problems of corruption, badly appointed government 
agencies, too few labour courts and an overall lack of fiscal resources. Also the ILO 
experts, that reviewed the latest "Decent Work Country Programme" for Bangladesh, came 
to the conclusion, that the state has "insufficient institutional capacity to enforce labour laws 
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and policies".208 However, they also stated, that "(t)he Government has not revised its 
overall labour policy for nearly 30 years"209, which indicates, that not institutional capacity 
problems, but also insufficient political will – which the managerial approach does not 
address – accounts for Bangladesh's low compliance status with the Convention C087. 
This can also be seen in the government's reaction to the accusations of the Bangladesh 
Cha – Sramik Union. Instead of coordinating a thorough and independent investigation of 
the events, it fully denied, that any violent abolition of worker's demonstrations through 
police forces might have occurred.210 Summing up, the Chayeses' approach is therefore 
only partially able to explain Bangladesh's failure to fully comply with the Convention C087.  
4.3 Application of the Reputational Theory 
Guzman's theory assumes, that states conduct a cost-benefit analysis and decide on this 
basis, whether to comply with an international legal obligation or not. As the case of the ILO 
Convention presents an "infinitely repeated game" in the sense, that it establishes long-
term commitments between - especially in the area of trade - frequently interacting states, 
Bangladesh should consider possible direct sanctions and reputational consequences of 
non-compliance. Bangladesh's cost-benefit analysis obviously came to the conclusion, that 
the costs of not complying with central parts of the ratified Convention C087 do not exceed 
the benefits of doing so. In order to analyse the explanatory power of Guzman's approach, 
these costs and benefits have to be determined and the possible existence of reputational 
consequences and direct sanctions in this case have to be analysed. 
The domestic costs of not adequately safeguarding the worker's rights to form unions and 
demonstrate for their rights are the danger of social upheavals and an increasingly 
frustrated working force. The widespread poverty in the country, however, debilitates the 
bargaining power of the workers, as the loss of the employment would have devastating 
consequences for the workers and their families. Also incidences like imprisonments or 
murders of union activists and violent police actions intimidate workers and deter them from 
large scale protests. Therefore, the domestic costs of a non-complying are rather low.  
The international costs of non-compliance with the Convention contain reputational 
damages and possible trade sanctions by the country's main trade partners. As previously 
mentioned, among the top importers of Bangladesh's export products are the United States, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and other European countries. All of these countries are also 
ILO members and except for the United States, that did not ratify the Convention C087, all 
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of them show high compliance levels with the Convention C087. They are highly stable 
parliamentary democracies, that set a high value on human rights, social justice and decent 
working conditions. Especially in recent years, there was also an increased public 
awareness in these countries of Bangladesh's poor working conditions and the repression 
of union's in the country. A review of the news coverage on the topic for example in 
Germany shows, that clothing manufacturers such as H&M, Adidas or C&A, were 
denunciated for producing there and therefore profiting from the exploitative working 
conditions in the country.211 This led to exerted incentives of the concerned companies to 
polish up their reputation by establishing codes of conduct and providing more transparency 
about their supplying factories. H&M, for example, explicitly refers to the ILO's fundamental 
Contentions in its code of conduct and published its global supply chain in an annual 
sustainability report.212 This public outrage about Bangladesh's labour policy and Western 
companies, that profit from these inhuman conditions, however, did not affect the bilateral 
economic and political relations between Bangladesh and its Western trading partners. 
Although politicians and diplomats of Bangladesh's main trading partners did express their 
concern about working conditions in Bangladesh213, the governments did not take 
measures to limit imports from Bangladesh, nor did they prompt their companies to 
suspend production in the country until national laws on workers' rights are improved.  
Bangladesh's exports to the United States and the European Union constantly increased 
during the last years.214 Regarding the United States, US imports from Bangladesh rose by 
13,2% from 2010 to 2011.215 Also foreign direct investment in Bangladesh increased with 
an impressive rate of 25 % from 910 Million US Dollar in 2010 to 1,13 Billion US Dollar in 
2011, especially due to new investments in the garment sector.216 
Next to a lack of significant reputational consequences, Bangladesh does not have to fear 
any direct sanctions. Due to its low development status, Bangladesh does not face any 
trade restrictions from the European Union. The European Union's Everything But Arms 
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(EBA) Agreement provides "quota-free access to the EU market".217 Regarding the United 
States, Bangladesh is part of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Program, 
which invites US investors to produce in Bangladesh and guarantees Bangladesh a duty-
free import of selected goods into the United States.218 Summarizing, it gets obvious, that 
Bangladesh's violation of its obligation under ILO Convention C087 did not result in any 
quantifiable reputational losses or direct political or economic sanctions. 
The benefits of non-compliance, on the other hand, are mainly of financial nature. 
Bangladesh's economic progress in the last decades was significantly based on the 
success of its export-oriented textile industry. With a great amount of workers, that are 
willing to work for an extremely low wage, Bangladesh was able to attract many foreign 
companies with its unprecedentedly low production costs. The country's eight EPZs, which 
were established in the 1980s, offer further amenities for foreign investors. In these free 
trade zones, imports of raw materials are duty free and export goods are not liable to tax.219  
If production costs in Bangladesh went up, it would have to be expected, that many foreign 
investors would leave the country and many of the Western companies, that are currently 
producing their clothes in Bangladesh, would look for supplying factories in other countries, 
such as Cambodia or Pakistan, which presents a serious threat to Bangladesh's economy. 
If workers were able to freely associate and form unions without interference, they would be 
able to organise their interests and be able to formulate concrete demands, such as higher 
wages, reasonable working hours or higher security standards in their workplaces. If 
peaceful demonstrations and strikes were possible, those demands could not be ignored in 
the long run and at least slow improvements of working conditions would be likely to occur. 
This, in turn, would lead to increased production costs and therefore less attractive 
investment and production conditions in Bangladesh. Thus, the government of Bangladesh 
has high benefits from its non-compliance with Convention C087.  
Taken together, the analysed costs and benefits of non-complying with the Convention are 
able to explain Bangladesh's low compliance status. As the analysis is mainly based on 
economic indicators, however, Guzman's theory does not include certain factors, such as 
the difficulties, that root in the low development status of Bangladesh. Therefore, it is also 
not able to cover all possibly relevant aspects. Summarizing, the conclusion can be drawn, 
that while Guzman's theory has difficulties to capture reasons of non-compliance, that are 
beyond the country's direct sphere of influence, the managerial approach has shortcomings 
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in that it does not take into consideration conscious decisions of non-compliance of states, 
for example due to economic benefits. 
5 Conclusion 
The presented case of the ILO and its Core Labour Standards in this bachelor thesis 
illustrated, that although being of essential importance - especially in the area of human 
rights - international law still faces severe difficulties regarding states' behaviour towards it. 
Despite the facts, that there is an impressively high numbers of ratifications of the CLS and 
the ILO's supervisory system is widely regarded as being exceptionally versatile, violations 
of the Conventions are still prevalent in many countries. In order to enhance legal 
compliance with the ILO's fundamental Conventions, it is of essential importance to conduct 
research on the motives behind states' behaviour towards these norms. Here, the 
numerous existing theories on the topic offer a variety of different approaches. By applying 
two of the most prominent contemporary compliance theories, this bachelor thesis gave first 
insights into the motives, that might be relevant to an ILO member state in its decision 
whether to comply with ratified ILO Conventions or not. Nevertheless, it is obvious, that one 
case study can never grasp all relevant aspects. Therefore, the examination of further case 
studies and the application of other theories to the case of the ILO would certainly prove 
useful in order to fully comprehend states' compliance decisions. In a subsequent step, it 
might additionally be possible to use this knowledge about states' motives regarding 
compliance for improving the supervisory and enforcement mechanisms of the CLS. 
With respect to the presented case study, the managerial theory of Chayes and Chayes 
illustrated, that low developed countries such as Bangladesh certainly face higher obstacles 
to comply with international treaties like the ILO Convention C087, than well developed 
countries. In an unconsolidated institutional setting with problems such as corruption, 
misallocations of fiscal resources and a low general education level, significant changes of 
national legislation and fundamental reforms of the administrative structure are surely much 
harder to accomplish than in a highly stable democracy. On the other hand, however, the 
government's refusal to fundamentally revise its labour policy also indicated a lack of 
political will. Guzman's reputational theory then revealed the economic benefits of non- 
compliance. This leads to the conclusion, that a better regulation for the implementation of 
trade sanctions might prove useful. In general, there are two ways, through which trade 
sanctions could be realized in cases of non-compliance: Bilateral trade agreements could 
entail provisions, that impose automatic trade sanctions, whenever severe violations of 
ratified labour rights Conventions occur. Here, however, the implementation of trade 
sanctions strongly hinges on the bilateral interests between the two concerned countries. 
While in the case of Myanmar, state imposed forced labour led to the imposition of trade 
35 
sanctions by the United States and the European Union220, the presented case study 
showed, that the option of trade sanctions was not considered by Bangladesh's main 
trading partners - despite a broad public awareness of Bangladesh's violations of ratified 
ILO Conventions. Thus, this approach would not necessarily lead to overall improvements 
and is therefore insufficient. The second way would be the inclusion of the ILO's 
fundamental Conventions into the body of rules of the World Trade Organization. This 
approach is much more promising. So far, however, this intensely debated proposal 
floundered on the resistance of developing countries, that argue, that this measure is based 
on protectionist considerations of industrialized countries and would impede development. 
Many empirical studies, however, indicated, that long-term development indicators and the 
level of compliance with the CLS in a country are positively related.221 A "social clause" in 
the World Trade Organization would entail the benefit, that developing countries would be 
freed of the risk, that an improvement of the CLS in the country leads to comparative 
disadvantages in the sense, that the country becomes less appealing for foreign investors, 
who then simply have the opportunity to move on to cheaper countries. If the CLS were part 
of the World Trade Organization's set of rules, all 157 member states would automatically 
be affected and thus, the possibilities for foreign investors to find cheaper alternatives 
would be significantly reduced. Therefore, further attempts to convince the opponents of 
this proposal of its benefits should be conducted in order to enhance the probability, that 
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I Overview on the eight Fundamental Conventions 
Abbreviation Title of the Convention Year of Adoption 
 
Ratifications 
C029 Forced Labour Convention 1930 175 
C087 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention 1948 151 
C098 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 161 
C100 Equal Remuneration Convention 1951 169 
C105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 1957 172 
C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958 170 
C138 Minimum Age Convention 1973 163 
C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 1999 175 
 
Source: International Labour Organization (n.d.): Ratification by Convention; available at: 

























II Observations, representations and complaints during the last three 















Source: International Labour Organization (n.d.): Supervision by country; available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11000:0::NO::: (last access: 07/01/13) 
 
 
III Finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma                          







Note: the underlined numbers mark the optimal behaviour of one country based on the assumption of a distinct 
behaviour of the other country. 
 
Source: Slightly modified illustration of Guzman, Andrew T. (2002): A Compliance – Based 
Theory of International Law; in: California Law Review, Vol. 90; p.1842, Figure A 
 
 
IV Compliance as dominant strategy 







Note: the underlined numbers mark the optimal behaviour of one country based on the assumption of a distinct 
behaviour of the other country. 
 
Source: Slightly modified illustration of Guzman, Andrew T. (2002): A Compliance – Based 




 Comply Violate 
Comply 5,5 2,6 
Violate 6,2 3,3 
 Comply Violate 
Comply 10,10 6,8 
Violate 8,6 4,4 
48 
V Infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Reputational Effects 
 









R = (1 + r) / r    R > 1 (with r being the discount rate, r > 0) 
 
5R = 5 + 5 / (1+r) + 5 / (1+r)2 + ...     
3R = 3 + 3 / (1+r) + 3 / (1+r)2 + …  
3 + 3R = 6 + 3 / (1+r) + 3 / (1+r)2 + …  =  3 + 3 + 3 / (1+r) + 3 / (1+r)2 + … 
3R  – 1= 2 + 3 / (1+r) + 3 / (1+r)2 + …  =  -1 + 3 + 3 / (1+r) + 3 / (1+r)2 + … 
 
General Formula for the present value of a perpetual annuity:  
        ∞ 
x + x / (1+r) + x / (1+r)2 + …. = Σ x/(1+r)n    Present value = (x / r) * (1+r) = x*((1+r)/r) = x*R       n = 1 
 
A State will comply, when:      
 
5R > 3 + 3R   
 
 R > 3/2  
              
(1+r)/r > 3/2 
 
 r < 2 
 
 
Source: Slightly modified illustration of Guzman, Andrew T. (2002): A Compliance – Based 
Theory of International Law; in: California Law Review, Vol. 90; p.1843, Figure C; own 
calculations based on formula from Berk, Jonathan, DeMarzo, Peter (2011): Grundlagen 







 Comply Violate 
Comply 5R , 5R 3R – 1, 3 + 3R 
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